It's the Strategy Stupid

What is the consensus for our war strategy in Iraq? If you pay much attention to the Mid-Term Election hype you will hear a plethora of interesting phrases emanating from both political parties: cut-and-run, redeployment, phased-withdrawal, timetable for withdrawal, stay the course, flexible stay the course….and so on. If one takes the time to tune out the incessant static of the talking heads, you will quickly realize that they all mean essentially the same thing: there simply is no coherent strategy coming from either party. It is now a documented fact that the Democrats support varying forms of military withdrawal from the conflict and if they mount a coup in November their focus in Iraq will geared in this direction. The Republicans on the other hand register all across the spectrum…all the way from stay the course to phased withdrawal…depending upon the politician, journalist, or news outlet the proposed strategy differs. With the stakes as high as they are in terms of national security, widespread contagion of militant Islam, the prestige of our great military, and the pride of our great nation; the strategy in Iraq is simple….to unconditionally win the fight. By blurring the strategic focus of our efforts in the region and subsequently placing constraints on our efforts in the region we are setting ourselves up for defeat in Iraq.

I will use the favorite analogy of the Left when referring to the War in Iraq: Vietnam. While the United States Military fought valiantly in Vietnam against an extremely determined foe, the fundamental error in our strategic planning was to enclose our ground operations below the 17th Parallel exclusively in South Vietnam. With the exception of the Cambodian excursion in 1970 and special ops missions in Laos, we did not venture into North Vietnam for fear of retribution by the Soviets and Chinese Communists. Knowing this, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces were able to alter their fighting strategy to match our self-inflicted constraints. It is a well understood fact that if General Westmoreland and later General Adams were allowed to cross the 17th Parallel, the North Vietnamese would have been thoroughly routed within a matter of months. However, by defining the campaign to fit exclusively within a formal set of boundaries and constraints, we grasped defeat from the jaws of victory at the hands of an enemy who followed no such rules. Ironically, the proclaimed “defeat” in the Vietnam War is defined as withdrawal. Fast forward 30 years and we have a similar scenario in Iraq: an overtly political and constrained fight against and enemy who knows no such boundaries, a strategy with an end goal of withdrawal, and a poorly managed domestic front. As it stands today, my prediction is that history will repeat itself in Iraq…that is if we do not change the course by redefining our strategy. By adopting a “fight to withdraw” policy through placing selective constraints on our war fighting strategy we are setting ourselves up for failure in Iraq. I’ll say it again; we will lose the fight in Iraq.

To redefine our mission in Iraq, I will flip back to another chapter of American History: World War II. The United States of “Greatest Generation” earned the moniker by its steadfast dedication to achieving the ultimate goal of unconditional victory. Hearing names like Iwo Jima, Normandy, Ardennes Forest, Saipan, and Tarawa all solicit an immediate sense of patriotism and pride for Americans because they are symbols of our perseverance, sacrifice, and most importantly victory. While the tide of World War II changed multiple times and at devastating cost, we did what it took to win…and winning was our ultimate goal. American commanders didn’t tell their troops to fight just hard enough so the French Resistance could take over from the Nazis or ask their Marines to continue to train the native population of Guadalcanal while letting the Japanese defenders take potshots at them from their spider holes in the jungle or reconsidered plans to crush Germany because deposing Hitler could create a martyr figure….sound familiar? The United States knew that the only way to achieve peace was to completely incapacitate and defeat its enemies in the Pacific and Europe. It is through this adopting this strategy that we will grasp victory from the jaws of defeat in Iraq.

It is with this historical analogy in mind there are three strategic proposals that must be implemented in order to win the fight in Iraq : complete military victory, diplomatic vigilance, and selling the American public. First, the military needs to be given one directive in regard to their operations in Iraq: destroy the enemy and deny him his base of operations. What this means will be defined by the commanders on the ground according the situations in their area of influence. Some provinces respond best to the carrot, others can only be brought in line by the stick…regardless, no more rules, just win the fight. Commanders need to prudently balance their priorities when it comes to training and operating with the new Iraqi military and fighting the insurgents. If we can use the Iraqis to help us, great, if not we use American soldiers. Unless we savagely defeat the insurgency in Iraq by all means available to us, casualties will continually trickle in. No borders, no rules, just win. Second, we need to diplomatically push for an Iraqi lead government which has been validated by the electorate. We need to allow them to create institutions they can call their own and respect their decisions when they are made in a legitimate matter. Going back to the first point, the primary focus should be on stopping the violence which will therefore allow peace to proliferate. Finally, a clear strategy of unconditional victory needs to be voice to the American public. The problem with public opinion is not the lack of support for the war itself but rather the discontent over our strategic confusion in the region. We are an infinitely competitive society, our culture places an extremely high value on winning whether it be in business, politics, reality television, or sports…Americans will understand the goal if it is placed in the context of our struggle in Iraq. People distrust the strategy in Iraq, they don’t distrust why we are there. It is the duty of the administration to voice this to the populace and tap into this social sentiment. Otherwise the war will be lost to the person who can sow the most discontent.

Until this strategic realignment occurs, there will be a continued blurring of our direction in Iraq and our success in the region will be jeopardized. We owe it to the sacrifice and commitment made by our country and military to win.